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The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment:




With a little imagination, one can easily picture a multitude of
situations in which an individual may wish to decline medical treatment:
a Jehovah's Witness who, because of his religious convictions, refuses to
accept a blood transfusion; a middle-aged man recently diagnosed with a
terminal illness who no longer wishes to endure painful medical
procedures which could prolong his life; a non-violent protester, fasting
to bring attention to his cause, who rejects intravenous nourishment.
Using a little more imagination, one can picture that the individual
wishing to decline medical treatment happens to be incarcerated. This
twist in the facts, however simple it may seem, is of major significance.
A patient's incarceration status drastically affects his or her right to
refuse medical treatment.'
Courts have generally held that a patient has a constitutionally
protected right to refuse unwanted medical treatment.2 This right to
refuse treatment has been held to be encompassed by an individual's
religious freedom under the First Amendment,3 one's right of privacy
emanating from specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights,4 and one's
liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. In their right to refuse
* J.D. Candidate (2008), The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University.
1. See infra notes 2-11.
2. Mitchell ex rel. Rasmussen, 741 P.2d 674, 682-83 (Ariz. 1987); Pub. Health
Trust of Dade County v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 98 (Fla. 1989); St. Mary's Hosp. v.
Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666, 669 (Fla. App. Ct. 1985); In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 405
(Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
3. Pub. Health Trust, 541 So. 2d at 98.
4. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424
(Mass. 1977) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965)).
5. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
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treatment analyses involving non-prisoners, courts balance the right or
rights asserted by the patient, whether it is religious freedom, right of
privacy, or a liberty interest, against countervailing state interests.6
Courts have identified these countervailing state interests as preserving
life, preventing suicide, maintaining the integrity of the medical
profession, and protecting innocent third persons.7 Such state interests
are normally held to be subordinate to a patient's autonomy.
8
In the case of a prison inmate, however, courts have acknowledged
that a state has an "important interest in maintaining the confinement of
the prisoner and the integrity of its correctional system."9 Thus, courts'
analyses concerning a prisoner's refusal of medical treatment balance not
only the aforementioned state interests against the prisoner's
constitutional rights, but also weigh additional state interests such as
preservation of internal order and discipline within the prison,
maintenance of institutional security, and the rehabilitation of
prisoners.10 This line of reasoning has led numerous courts to deny
prison inmates a right to refuse unwanted medical treatment.1" In fact, in
only three states have courts recognized a prisoner's right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment.'
2
After exploring the foundations of freedom of religion, right of
privacy, and liberty in our society, this comment examines the balancing
test utilized by courts in cases involving a non-inmate's right to refuse
medical treatment, as well as the balancing tests applied by courts in the
context of a prison inmate's right to refuse medical treatment."3 This
Comment explores in depth the case of In re Caulk, a case in which a
prisoner's right to refuse medical treatment was denied.14 The Comment
then examines some courts' use of claims of preservation of internal
order and security within a prison as a branch of their balancing tests,
viewed in light of other courts' special treatment of HIV positive
inmates. 15 The Comment further makes note of the tax consequences
resulting from the more stringent balancing tests applied by courts in the
prisoner context.' 6 Finally, the Comment looks at the various methods of
6. State ex rel. Schuetzle v. Vogel, 537 N.W.2d 358, 360 (N.D. 1995).
7. Id.
8. Id. (citing Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 383 (Cal. 1993)).
9. Id. (quoting In re Adoption of J.S.P.L., 532 N.W.2d 653, 662 (N.D. 1995)).
10. Comm'r of Corr. v. Meyers, 399 N.E.2d 452, 457 (Mass. 1979).
11. Id.; Haynes v. Harris, 344 F.2d 463, 465 (8th Cir. 1965); Garza v. Carlson, 877
F.2d 14, 17 (8th Cir. 1989).
12. Mara Silver, Testing Cruzan: Prisoners and the Constitutional Question of Self
Starvation, 58 STAN. L. REv. 631, 656-57 (2005).
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part III.A.
15. See infra Part III.B.
16. See infra Part III.C.
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force-feeding, an issue often at the center of cases involving a prisoner's
right to refuse medical treatment.17 The Comment ultimately concludes
that the applicable balancing test regarding refusal of medical treatment
should be one of uniformity, regardless of a patient's incarceration status.
II. Background
By definition, rights give an individual "zones of unchecked
discretionary action" that no other citizen may invade.' 8 Rights may be
claimed no matter how inconvenient they are to other members of
society.1 9 The fact that rights may be so claimed is what defines them as
rights.20 Essentially, rights are what give an individual protection against
the "tyranny of the majority and against the power of the state.'
Religious freedom, privacy, and liberty are rights commonly
asserted by individuals claiming a right to refuse unwanted medical
22treatment. In determining whether an individual may refuse medical
treatment, courts balance the right or rights asserted by the individual
against countervailing state interests.23 A patient's incarceration status
affects the state interests used in this balancing test, and ultimately leads
to different results in the prisoner and non-prisoner settings. 4
A. Religion as a Fundamental Right
Individuals wishing to refuse medical treatment have often
grounded their arguments upon their religious freedom under the First
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 25  The First
Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 26 forbids Congress to make any law prohibiting the free
exercise of religion.27 Freedom of religion is a fundamental right. 8 The
17. See infra Part III.D.
.18. In re Brown, 478 So.2d 1033, 1036 (Miss. 1985).
19. Id.
20. Id. (citing Read v. State, 430 So.2d 832, 840 (Miss. 1983)).
21. Id.
22. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990); Mitchell ex rel.
Rasmussen, 741 P.2d 674, 682 (Ariz. 1987); St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So.2d 666,
668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
23. State ex rel. Schuetzle v. Vogel, 537 N.W.2d 358, 360 (N.D. 1995).
24. See cases cited supra notes 2-12.
25. Pub. Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So.2d 96, 97 (Fla. 1989); St. Mary's Hosp., 465
So.2d at 668.
26. Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d
359, 361 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Cantwell v Connecticut., 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)).
27. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I.).
28. Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 594 (1942) (citing Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939)).
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right of free exercise of religion protects more than mere beliefs.29
Actions or conduct based upon religious beliefs are often beyond the
authority of a state to control.30 For instance, where conduct based upon
religious beliefs is a refusal to act rather than affirmative conduct, "the
State's authority to interfere is virtually non-existent except only in the
instance of the grave and immediate public danger."
31
Courts have given great deference to an individual's right to refuse
medical treatment because of his or her religious views.32 In upholding
an individual's right to refuse treatment based upon religious grounds,
courts have stated that nothing is more private or more sacred than one's
religion or view of life.33 One court recognized that many individuals
prefer the thought of everlasting life and salvation rather than the
additional time on this earth afforded to them by forced medical
treatment.3" Because the founders of this country believed so strongly in
the dominance of individual- rights in such highly personal matters as
religion, they created laws securing to all the right to the free exercise of
religion.
35
B. Right of Privacy
Individuals wishing to refuse medical treatment have also
commonly based arguments supporting such a refusal upon their right of
privacy.36 The United States Constitution does not expressly mention a
right of privacy.37 The Supreme Court, however, has recognized that a
right of personal privacy does exist under the Constitution.38 This right
of privacy "emanates from the penumbra of specific guarantees of
particular Amendments to the Constitution," 39 and every individual
enjoys a right to privacy. 4°
29. In re Brown, 478 So.2d 1033, 1037 (Miss. 1985).
30. Id.
31. Id. (explaining that refusal of a state mandated vaccination necessary for
preservation of the public health does not fall within an individual's right to free exercise,
while refusal to attend formal secondary education to age sixteen falls within this right).
32. Pub. Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So.2d 96, 98 (Fla. 1989); St. Mary's Hosp. v.
Ramsey, 465 So.2d 666, 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (citations omitted).
33. Pub. Health Trust, 541 So.2d at 98; see also In re Brown, 478 So.2d at 1035
("Man has long sought to live according to his religious beliefs and to be let alone in the
process.").
34. St. Mary's Hosp., 465 So.2d at 668.
35. In re Brown, 478 So.2d at 1035.
36. Mitchell ex rel. Rasmussen, 741 P.2d 674, 682 (Ariz. 1987); Pub. Health Trust,
541 So.2d at 97.
37. Rasmussen, 741 P.2d at 681.
38. Id. (citing Roev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973)).
39. Id. (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 152).
40. In re Brown, 478 So.2d at 1039.
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Justice Brandeis referred to the right of privacy as "the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. 41
An individual's "right to make decisions vitally affecting his private life
according to his own conscience" is a cornerstone upon which this
country was founded.42 The right of privacy is so personal that its
protection does not require giving a reason for its exercise.43 As noted
by the court in In re Brown, "[t]hat one is a person, unique and
individual, is enough. 44
The right of privacy protects only those personal rights that are
"fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. ' '
Numerous courts have held that the right to refuse medical treatment is a
personal right amply "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty" to fall under the protections of the right of privacy.46 In
sum, courts have held that an individual's right to refuse medical
treatment is encompassed by his or her right of privacy.47
C. Liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment
Lastly, individuals wishing to refuse medical treatment have based
arguments supporting such a refusal upon their liberty interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.48  The
Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that no person shall be
deprived of liberty without due process of law.49 Moreover, the concept
of liberty reaches the full range of conduct which an individual is free to
pursue. 50 The Supreme Court has stated that a competent person has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment.5
41. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
42. Pub. Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons, 541 So.2d 96, 98 (Fla. 1989) (citing
Wons v. Public Health Trust of Dade County, 500 So.2d 679, 686-87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987)).
43. In re Brown, 478 So.2d at 1040.
44. Id.
45. Mitchell ex rel. Rasmussen, 741 P.2d 674, 681 (Ariz. 1987) (quoting Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976)).
46. Id. at 683; Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1137, (Cal. App.
Dep't Super. Ct. 1986); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626, 638 (Mass.
1986).
47. Rasmussen, 741 P.2d at 683; Bouvia, 179 Cal.App.3d at 1137; Brophy, 497
N.E.2d at 638.
48. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
49. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
50. State v. Guidry, 96 P.3d 242, 248 (Haw. 2004) (citing Boiling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954)).
51. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
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D. Applicable Balancing Tests
In their right to refuse treatment analyses, courts must balance the
right or rights asserted by the patient, whether it is religious freedom,
right of privacy, or a liberty interest against countervailing state
interests.52 These state interests, identified as preserving life, preventing
suicide, maintaining the integrity of the medical profession, and
protecting innocent third persons, are normally held to be subordinate to
a patient's autonomy. 3
Notwithstanding the protections of First and Fourteenth
Amendments and the penumbra of guarantees under the Bill of Rights,
courts have regularly denied prison inmates a right to refuse unwanted
medical treatment.5 4 This is because the test applied by courts when a
prisoner is involved balances not only the above mentioned state interests
against the prisoner's rights, but also additional state interests such as
preservation of internal order and discipline within the prison,
maintenance of institutional security, and rehabilitation of prisoners 5
These additional factors applied by courts in the prisoner context
continually tip the balancing test in favor of the state.56
III. Analysis
Considering the importance of religion, privacy, and liberty in our
society, it does not appear that a stricter balancing test in the prisoner
context is appropriate. It is not necessarily clear that the reasoning
proffered by courts in denying inmates a right to refuse unwanted
medical treatment adequately supports such a denial. Freedom of
religion, right of privacy, and liberty are some of the most noteworthy
building blocks on which this country was formed. 7 The more stringent
balancing test currently utilized by courts concerning inmates' right to
refuse treatment ignores the stress placed on religion, privacy, and liberty
in the foundation of our nation, and unfairly strips inmates of the
protections of such rights.
A. An Inmate's Wish to "Die with Dignity"
An examination of the case of In re Caulk,58 one of the more
52. State ex rel. Schuetzle v. Vogel, 537 N.W.2d 358, 360 (N.D. 1995).
53. Id.
54. Garza v. Carlson, 877 F.2d 14, 17 (8th Cir. 1989); Haynes v. Harris, 344 F.2d
463, 465 (8th Cir. 1965); Comm'r of Corr. v. Meyers, 399 N.E.2d 452, 458 (Mass. 1979).
55. Meyers, 399 N.E.2d at 457.
56. See generally Meyers, 399 N.E.2d 452.
57. See supra Part II.
58. In re Caulk, 480 A.2d 93 (N.H. 1984).
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compelling cases involving denial of an inmate's right to refuse medical
treatment, sheds light on the harshness of the current test. Mr. Caulk, a
thirty-six-year-old prisoner, was sentenced to a minimum of thirty-five
years in prisons in three states, which the court admitted was
"tantamount to a life sentence without parole." 59 In New Hampshire, he
was serving a ten to twenty-year sentence for aggravated felonious
sexual assault. 60 A five to ten-year consecutive sentence for burglary
was set to commence upon completion of the ten to twenty-year
sentence. 61 Additional charges were pending in California against the
inmate.62 Mr. Caulk also claimed to be subject to a twenty to thirty-year
sentence in Massachusetts, to be served consecutively to his New
Hampshire sentences.63
Mr. Caulk stopped eating solid food on February 26, 1984, several
months before his case was heard by the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire. 64 Since that day, he had been allowing himself to die slowly
by refusing to consume any nourishment with the exception of certain
liquids.65 Mr. Caulk had appealed to the state supreme court because the
trial court had ruled that the state was authorized to force-feed and
nourish him over his objection.66
Mr. Caulk claimed in his appeal that he purposely selected this
method of dying so that he could remain competent throughout the dying
67,6process. He wanted to "think, feel, and understand his death. 68 He
insisted that he was not committing suicide but rather allowing himself to
die.
69
Knowing that he would never be released from prison, Mr. Caulk
stated that he was tired, unhappy, and disappointed with life's
promises. 70 He felt that he did not "belong on the streets.,, 7  He stated
that if he could not live freely, then he would rather not live at all.72
Although physically down, Mr. Caulk claimed to be emotionally high.73
Moreover, Mr. Caulk believed a "spiritual dimension" existed





64. In re Caulk, 480 A.2d 93, 94 (N.H. 1984).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 95.
67. Id. at 94.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 95.
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within him and his actions.74 Mr. Caulk admitted that he had failed to
live a religious life and had hurt many people but testified that whenever
he felt pain on his starvation diet, he believed that he was paying his debt
for his past misdeeds.75 In his own words, Mr. Caulk wanted to "leave
the world as a man and to die with dignity, with his head up."
76
Contrary to several other prisoner hunger strike cases, in which the
main aim of an inmate was to gain attention from prison officials or the
public and to manipulate the prison system,77 Mr. Caulk's intention was
altogether different.78 Mr. Caulk's sole desired result was his own death;
he possessed no ulterior motives and did not attempt to manipulate the
system or anyone within it. 79 Further, Mr. Caulk was prepared to sign a
release absolving the state of all civil liability which could have
potentially arisen as a result of his death.8°
Despite the compelling freedom of religion and right of privacy
claims offered by Mr. Caulk, coupled with the absence of any intent on
behalf of Mr. Caulk to gain public attention or manipulate the prison
system, the state prevailed in the Supreme Court of New Hampshire's
balancing test. 8' The state supreme court upheld the trial court's ruling,
which authorized the state to force-feed and nourish Mr. Caulk over his
objection.82 Further, the only way for Mr. Caulk to avoid force-feeding
was to voluntarily consume medically required nourishment.
83
1. Maintenance of an Effective Criminal Justice System
In affirming the trial court, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
balanced Mr. Caulk's-right of privacy against the state's countervailing
interest in the maintenance of an effective criminal justice system.84 The
court cited the state's argument that. if Mr. Caulk was allowed to refuse
medical nourishment until his death, he would be escaping prosecution
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. In re Caulk, 480 A.2d 93, 95 (N.H. 1984).
77. Id. at 98 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing State ex rel. White v. Narick, 292
S.E.2d 54, 58 (W.Va. 1982); In re Sanchez, 577 F. Supp. 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
78. In re Caulk, 480 A.2d 93, 98 (N.H. 1984) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
79. See id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 95.
81. Id. at 97 (the test balanced Mr. Caulk's right of privacy against the state's
interest in maintenance of an effective criminal justice system, preservation of life, and
prevention of suicide. The court did not weigh Mr. Caulk's right to free exercise of
religion in the balance because it concluded that only his right of privacy was implicated.
Importantly, the court noted that even if it had determined that Mr. Caulk's right to
religious freedom was implicated, its analysis would have been the same).
82. Id. at 95.
83. See id.
84. In re Caulk, 480 A.2d at 96.
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for his crimes and thereby frustrating the purpose of the criminal justice
system. 85 The court further noted the state's claim that Mr. Caulk's
death would somehow affect the public's perception of the criminal
justice system's ability to successfully respond to accusations of criminal
behavior.
86
It is important to note that the state's arguments regarding public
perception and frustration of the criminal justice system if the inmate
were allowed to die were speculative. 87 The arguments were supported
by no empirical evidence whatsoever.88 The court, however, accepted
such arguments as fact and then concluded that the state's interests were
sufficient to outweigh Mr. Caulk's asserted rights.89
Even if the state's arguments were true, these arguments, one would
imagine, would not outweigh an individual's constitutional rights.90 The
Constitution of the United States gives each individual the freedom of
religion, a right of privacy, and an interest in liberty. 91 Nowhere does the
Constitution make these rights contingent on the ideals of a majority.92
One can easily imagine, for example, the implications of a society in
which religious views of individuals that are inconsistent with views of
the majority are to be restricted. One cannot seriously argue that the
Framers of the Constitution intended any such outcome. It is thus
unclear what would lead a court to base its decision to restrict an
individual's constitutional rights upon alleged public views. 93
2. Preservation of Life and Prevention of Suicide
In reaching its decision, the court also balanced Mr. Caulk's right of
privacy against the state's countervailing interests in preservation of life
and prevention of suicide.94 In its application of this prong of the test,
the majority in In re Caulk relied on the fact that Mr. Caulk was not
facing death from a terminal illness. 95 As noted by the dissent, reliance
on the absence of a terminal illness "ignores the non-physical quality of
life and reduces the quality of life to mere physical well-being.'
96
Essentially, the majority believed that Mr. Caulk's life could be valued
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 98 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
88. See id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
89. In re Caulk, 480 A.2d at 97.
90. Id. at 99 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
91. See generally U.S. CONST.
92. See id.
93. See In re Caulk, 480 A.2d at 96.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 99 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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solely in terms of his physical health.97 The majority apparently ignored
Mr. Caulk's claims that he was emotionally high and felt spirituality in
his actions. 98 While it is true that the court's decision kept the inmate's
heart beating, the decision likely reduced the inmate's mental well-being
to a state lower than it was before he attempted to exercise his
constitutional rights.99
B. Preservation of Order and Institutional Security: A Hypocritical
Claim
Courts also have denied inmates a right to refuse unwanted medical
treatment by balancing an inmate's asserted rights against governmental
interests in the preservation of internal order and discipline within the
prison and the maintenance of institutional security.100 Admittedly,
courts' denials of an inmate's right to refuse medical treatment based
upon these interests appear, at least on the surface, meritorious.101 Such
denials, however, seem disingenuous when considered in light of some
courts' treatment of a special category of prison inmates, those infected
with HIV.10 2  Courts have recognized that prison inmates have a
constitutional right to privacy regarding their HIV-positive status.
0 3
In Powell, the Second Circuit began with the notion that individuals
infected with the HIV virus possess a constitutional right to privacy
regarding their condition. 10 4 The court noted that "[p]rison inmates do
not shed all fundamental protections of the Constitution at the prison
gate." 10 5  Inmates retain those rights not inconsistent with legitimate
penological objectives of the corrections system.10 6 Prison officials can
only impinge upon an inmate's rights to the extent that the official's
actions are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.10 7 The
97. See id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
98. See id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
99. See In re Caulk, 480 A.2d at 99 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
100. See Meyers, supra note 10.
101. See State ex rel. Schuetzle v. Vogel, 537 N.W.2d 358, 363-64 (N.D. 1995)
(holding that the inmate could not refuse insulin injections because such refusal was an
attempt on behalf of the inmate to control his prison environment, and prison officials
must be given the ability to maintain order and security within the prison).
102. See Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Hilaire v. Ariz.
Dep't of Corr., 934 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1991); Faison v. Parker, 823 F. Supp. 1198 (E.D.
Pa. 1993).
103. See Powell, 175 F.3d 107; see also Hilaire, 934 F.2d 324; Parker, 823 F. Supp.
1198.
104. Powell, 175 F.3d at 110 (citing Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d
Cir. 1994)).
105. Id. at 112 (quoting Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994)).
106. Id. (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).
107. Id.
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Second Circuit held that a prison guard's disclosure of an inmate's HIV-
positive status violated the inmate's right to privacy because the
disclosure was not reasonably related to any legitimate state interest.1
0 8
HIV, or the human immunodeficiency virus, is the virus that causes
AIDS. 109 The virus may be passed from one person to another when
infected blood, semen, or vaginal secretions come in contact with an
uninfected person's broken skin or mucous membranes.' 10 HIV is spread
by sexual contact with an infected person, by sharing syringes with
someone who is infected, or through transfusions of infected blood.111
People with HIV have what is called "HIV infection."' 12 Some of these
people will develop AIDS as a result of their HIV infection. 
1 3
AIDS is an acronym that stands for Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome. 114  HIV infection becomes AIDS when an individual's
immune system is seriously damaged.1 15 If an individual has fewer than
200 CD4 cells or if the individual's CD4 percentage is less than fourteen
percent, the individual has AIDS.116 Alternatively, if the individual
develops what is known as an opportunistic infection, the individual has
AIDS.'1 17 AIDS is different in every infected person. 18 Some people die
a few months after getting infected, while others may live for several
years after being diagnosed with AIDS. 
19 There is no cure for AIDS. 120
Ultimately, every individual infected with AIDS will die as a result of
the infection.121
The estimated prevalence of HIV infection is nearly five times
higher for incarcerated populations than for the general U.S.
population. 122  One study prepared by the Georgia Department of
108. Id.
109. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, WHAT Is HIV?, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/resources/qa/qal.htm (last visited
December 10, 2006).
110. Id.
111. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, HIV FACTS, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/resources/factsheets/transmission.htm
(last visited December 10, 2006).
112. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, WHAT Is HIV?.
113. Id.
114. AIDS.ORG, A PROJECT OF COMMUNITY PARTNERS, WHAT Is AIDS?,






120. AIDS.ORG, A PROJECT OF COMMUNITY PARTNERS, WHAT Is AIDS?.
121. See id.
122. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/
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Corrections between July 1988 and February 2005 found a total of
eighty-eight inmates who were known to have had both a negative HIV
test result upon entry into prison and a subsequent confirmed positive
HIV test result during incarceration. 123  The report identified the
following characteristics as associated with HIV transmission in prison:
male-male sex in prison, tattooing in prison, older age, having served
more than five years of the current sentence, black race, and having a
body mass index of less than 25.4 kg/m
2 on entry into prison. 124
In spite of the clear-cut data regarding HIV transmission between
inmates, courts have held that no legitimate state interest exists to justify
overriding an inmate's right to privacy regarding his or her HIV-positive
status. 125 Counterintuitively, other courts have held that a state's interest
in maintaining internal order and security within a prison sufficiently
trump an inmate's right to privacy when an attempt to refuse medical
treatment is at issue. 126 Put another way, such holdings stand for the
proposition that a state's interest in maintaining order and security within
a prison remains unthreatened when an inmate is secretly infected with a
contagious and ultimately fatal disease, but is at such high risk when an
inmate wishes to refuse medical treatment that this inmate's
constitutional rights should be invaded.
The eighty-eight inmates discovered by the Georgia Department of
Corrections to have been infected with HIV during their incarceration are
undeniable proof that keeping an inmate's HIV status a secret could
jeopardize the health of other inmates.127 The HIV-negative inmate who
wishes to refuse unwanted medical treatment poses no threat of harm to
anyone other than himself.128 Common sense should dictate that the
situation in which the internal order and security structure of a prison is
truly in jeopardy is a situation in which an HIV-positive inmate is
concealed amongst uninfected fellow inmates and guards. The potential
for widespread disaster in such a situation is clear: the infected inmate
possesses the ability to infect other unsuspecting individuals, and may
continue to do so at will, all the while chipping away at the existing
preview/mmwrhtml/mm5515 al .htm (last visited December 10, 2006).
123. Id.
124. Id.
.125. See cases cited supra note 102.
126. See Comm'r of Corr. v. Meyers, 399 N.E.2d 452, 457 (Mass. 1979).
127. See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT; see also In re Caulk, 480
A.2d 93, 100 (N.H. 1984) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERTY, in 43 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 271 (1952)) (noting Mill's view
that the only situation in which the denial of an individual's liberty is justified is when a
potential for others to be harmed exists).
128. See generally In re Caulk, 480 A.2d 93 (N.H. 1984).
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internal order and security within the prison. 29 Yet many courts view
the inmate who desires to refuse unwanted medical treatment-the same
inmate who poses no threat to any other individual, who simply wishes




In addition to the constitutional and ethical concerns, tax
consequences exist resulting from the denial of an inmate's right to
refuse medical treatment.131 According to the United States Department
of Justice, state prison operating expenditures in 2001 totaled $28.4
billion. 132 The average annual operating cost per inmate was $22,632, or
$62.05 per day. 133 Further, inmate medical care comprised $3.3 billion,
or about 12% of state operating expenditures. 134 These expenditures are
borne directly by the taxpayers in every state.
135
The Department of Justice statistics reveal that each inmate who
wished to and successfully did end his or her life by refusing medical
treatment would reduce total state prison operating expenditures by
approximately $22,632 per year. 136 This is not to say that every inmate
who refuses medical treatment will ultimately lose his life. In the least,
however, an inmate's refusal of all available medical treatment will save
the state an average of $2,715.84 per year. 137 Such decreases in prison
expenditures will result in direct savings to a state's taxpayers.
138
Examining a hypothetical situation demonstrates how the tax
consequences quickly add up. Take an inmate who is thirty-years old
and serving a life sentence. This inmate has a life expectancy of an
additional fifty years. 139 Assuming that the inmate decides to refuse
129. See cases cited supra notes 104-08.
130. See In re Caulk, 480 A.2d at 97; see also Garza v. Carlson, 877 F.2d 14, 17 (8th
Cir. 1989).
131. See JAMES J. STEPHANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: STATE





135. See In re Caulk, 480 A.2d at 98 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
136. See STEPHANS, supra note 131.
137. See id. (Approximately 12% of the total annual operating cost per inmate is
comprised of an inmate's medical expenditures. Given a total annual cost per inmate of
$22,632, 12% of $22,632 amounts to an average of $2,715.84 per inmate).
138. See In re Caulk, 480 A.2d at 98 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
139. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, ACTUARIAL PUBLICATIONS, PERIOD LIFE
TABLE, http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/table4c6.html (last visited December 20,
2006).
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lifesaving medical treatment, taxpayers will save approximately
$1,131,600 over the fifty years that the inmate's life would have
spanned.1 40  As of June 30, 2005, the nationwide prison population
totaled 2,186,230.141 It is crucial to keep in mind that the hypothetical
$1,131,600 in tax savings represents the death of only one inmate. While
it is not clear exactly how many inmates would choose such a drastic
course of action if presented with the opportunity, it is incontestable that
potential tax savings could be enormous.
D. Methods of Force-Feeding
Many times, the type of medical treatment that an inmate seeks to
refuse is that of force-feeding. 142 As noted by the dissenting opinion in
In re Caulk, it is "difficult to imagine a greater intrusion upon one's right
to bodily integrity and self-determination than force-feeding.
14 3
Accordingly, doctors around the world have condemned the procedure.
144
There are two methods of force-feeding generally authorized by courts
when an inmate refuses to eat.' 45 Nasogastric feeding, the method most
commonly approved by courts, is accomplished by inserting a soft tube
into the nose, through the esophagus, and directly into the stomach.
146
As illustrated in Caulk, nasogastric tube-feeding can be both painful and
dangerous:
No novocaine was used during the insertion of the tube. [The
prisoner] suffered a great deal of pain and discomfort as a result of
the constant irritation of the tube on his throat and nasal passages.
His efforts to resist the painful swallowing reflex caused him to
suffer severe headaches. The tube was removed due to the danger of
imminent ulceration of his throat and nasal passages.147
The case of In re Soliman illustrates further problems with
nasogastric feeding:
[M]edical personnel initially inserted a large tube into his nose,
which did not fit. The medical personnel then attempted to insert
smaller and smaller tubes until [the prisoner's] nose began bleeding
140. See STEPHANS, supra note 131 ($22,632 [average annual operating cost per
inmate] x 50 years = $1,131,600. Note that this figure likely represents a minimum due
to inflation).
141. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON STATISTICS,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/prisons.htm (last visited December 21, 2006).
142. In re Caulk, 480 A.2d at 95; Garza v. Carlson, 877 F.2d 14, 16 (8th Cir. 1989).
143. In re Caulk, 480 A.2d at 99 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
144. Silver, supra note 12, at 637 (citing http://www.wma.net/e/policy/h31.htm).
145. Id.
146. Id. (citing In re Hier, 464 N.E.2d 959, 961-62 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984)).
147. Id. (quoting In re Caulk, 480 A.2d at 99).
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internally. The doctor ordered that [the prisoner] be injected with an
anesthetic, and a gastric tube inserted through his mouth. Since then,
[he] has received an injection of anesthetic and a gastric tube through
the mouth every three days.
148
The second method of force-feeding approved by courts occurs
intravenously, with the needle penetrated into a major blood vessel.
149
As with tube-feeding, intravenous injections can also jeopardize the well-
being of inmates. 150  One major problem is that unless the inmate is
sedated, he will often attempt to reject treatment by pulling out the
needles used to deliver nutrients. 151 The result could be severe blood loss
which could be fatal in less than five minutes. 152 Further, intravenous
injections carry a risk of infection, especially given the possibility of
interference by inmates. 153
As illustrated by In re Caulk and In re Soliman, the invasiveness of
force-feeding upon an inmate is significant. 154 The Supreme Court of the
United States recently held that a liberty interest in the correctional
context becomes greater as conditions or hardships become more
significant. 155 It would appear that in the context of force-feeding, a
liberty interest asserted by an inmate should be strong enough to tip any
court's balancing test in favor of the inmate. 156 Inexplicably, however,
only a handful of state courts have refused to force-feed an inmate, and
every federal court to address the issue has sanctioned the procedure.' 
57
In his work On Liberty, John Stuart Mill described the extent to
which an individual's liberty extends:
[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilized [sic] community, against his
will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot
rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be
better for him to do so, because it will make him happier,
because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or
148. Id. (quoting In re Soliman, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1245 (N.D. Ala. 2001),
vacated as moot, 296 F.3d 1237 (11 th Cir. 2002)).
149. Id.
150. Silver, supra note 12, at 637.
151. Id.
152. Id. (citing In re Hier, 464 N.E.2d 959, 962 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984); Comm'r of
Corr. v. Meyers, 399 N.E.2d 452, 454 (Mass. 1979)).
153. Id. at 637-38 (citing In re Hier, 464 N.E.2d at 962).
154. See Silver, supra note 12.
155. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 222-35 (2005).
156. See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 222-25.
157. Silver, supra note 12, at 638.
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even right.
158
In sum, Mill argues that the only situation in which the denial of an
individual's liberty is justified is when a potential for others to be harmed
exists. 159 In the absence of a threat of such harm, denial of liberty is
unconscionable. 160  Mills further noted that "[m]ankind are greater
gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than
by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest."'
161
In most cases, the prisoner wishing to refuse force-feeding poses no
harm to anyone other than himself, yet courts subject the prisoner to
undue pain and suffering through such force-feeding. 162 It appears as
though the interests of justice would be better served through deference
to the writings of John Stuart Mill. 163 In the prisoner context, however,
Mill's concept of an individual's liberty interest rarely prevails due to the
more stringent balancing test applied by courts. 164  Mill would
undoubtedly consider courts' force-feeding of prisoners a travesty.
Unless and until courts begin to apply a uniform balancing test to
incarcerated and non-incarcerated patients alike, John Stuart Mill's
writings on liberty will remain sound in theory, but unworkable in
application.
IV. Conclusion
Freedom of religion, right of privacy, and liberty are some of the
most important aspects of a democratic society. It is for this reason that
these rights continually outweigh state interests in courts' balancing tests
when a non-incarcerated patient wishes to refuse medical treatment.
When a prisoner wants to refuse medical treatment, state interests in
preserving the integrity of the correctional system tip courts' balancing
test in favor of the state. Often times, the reasoning offered by courts to
bolster state claims of preserving the integrity of the correctional system
is unsubstantiated or appears insincere. This unsubstantiated reasoning
coupled with a much more stringent balancing test is a formula for
disaster. The result is that prisoners are unfairly stripped of their
158. In re Caulk, 480 A.2d 93, 100 (N.H. 1984) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, in 43 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 271
(1952)).
159. See id. (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting MILL, ON LIBERTY, in GREAT BOOKS OF
THE WESTERN WORLD at 271).
160. See id. (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting MILL, ON LIBERTY, in GREAT BOOKS OF
THE WESTERN WORLD at 271).
161. Id. at 236-37 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting MILL, ON LIBERTY, in GREAT
BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD at 273).
162. See id.; see also In re Soliman, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (N.D. Ala. 2001).
163. See In re Caulk, 480 A.2d at 100.
164. See Comm'r of Corr. v. Meyers, 399 N.E.2d 452, 457 (Mass. 1979).
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fundamental constitutional rights. Besides the fact that balancing tests in
the prisoner setting are often justified with unsupported claims, there are
enormous tax consequences that result from denying inmates a right to
refuse treatment. Consequently, the test regarding refusal of medical
treatment should not consider a patient's incarceration status; instead the
test should be one of uniformity.

